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A B S T R A C T We tested whether children with and without high-
functioning autism spectrum disorders (HFASD) differ in their under-
standing of the influence of mood states on behaviour. A total of 122
children with HFASD or typical development were asked to predict and
explain the behaviour of story characters during hypothetical social
interactions. HFASD and typically developing children predicted at
equal rates that mood states likely result in similar valenced behaviour.
‘Explicit’ descriptions were used to explain predictions more often by
children with HFASD than by typically developing children. However,
‘implicit’ and ‘irrelevant’ descriptions elicited fewer mood references
among HFASD children. Furthermore, they less often referred to the
uncertainty of the influence of mood on behaviour, and less often
used mood-related explanations, in particular when they had to rely
on implicit information. This may indicate a rote- rather than self-
generated understanding of emotions in children with HFASD.
A D D R E S S Correspondence should be addressed to: S A N D E R B E G E E R PhD, Faculty
of Psychology and Education, Developmental Psychology, Vrije Universiteit, Van der
Boechorststraat 1, 1081 BT Amsterdam,The Netherlands. e-mail: S.Begeer@psy.vu.nl
Autism has often been related to poor emotional skills (Hobson, 2002). In
particular low-functioning, mentally retarded children with autism spectrum
disorders (ASD) have been found to be less attentive to emotional
expressions in other people, to communicate emotions in a less appropri-
ate fashion and to be less aware of the subjective nature of emotions than
children without ASD (Kasari et al.,1990). Children with autism spectrum
disorders and normal IQ (i.e. high-functioning children with autism
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spectrum disorders, HFASD) appear to have an adequate elementary under-
standing of basic emotions, such as happiness, fear, anger and sadness. At 8
to 10 years of age they recognize emotional expressions, name emotions
and understand emotion-related contexts and causes at equal rates as their
typically developing peers (Capps et al., 1995; Davies et al., 1994; Downs
and Smith, 2004; Peterson et al., 2005). However, despite these abilities,
various researchers found pragmatic problems related to the emotional
understanding of individuals with HFASD, including the use of superficial
and scripted responses (Adams et al., 2002; Hale and Tager-Flusberg, 2005),
failure to generalize their understanding and provide informative explan-
ations (Beversdorf et al., 1998; Hadwin et al., 1997), and a need for explicit
cues to trigger their explanations of emotions (Loveland et al., 1997; Begeer
et al., 2006; Rieffe et al., 2000). These problems are closely related to the
social, communicative and restricted repetitive impairments that character-
ize autism spectrum disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
This study aimed to further delineate the suggested cognitive strength and
pragmatic weakness with regard to the understanding of emotions of
children with HFASD. We addressed four topics: the elementary understand-
ing of basic emotions, the pragmatics in the explanations of these emotions,
the need for explicit cues in triggering adequate responses and explanations
of emotions, and the acknowledgement of the uncertain nature of emotions.
First, a generally agreed upon purpose of understanding emotions is that
it can be informative about other people’s subjective states and can allow the
anticipation and comprehension of other people’s behaviour (Cole et al.,
2004). Typically developing 6-year-olds can connect mood states and behav-
ioural tendencies on an elementary level, following the simple rule that
positive or negative mood states are connected to positive or negative
behaviour, respectively (Harris et al., 1981). Given their normal IQ, the
reasoning skills of school aged children with HFASD should allow them to
use such basic rules.
Second, typically developing 10-year-olds can be found to spontaneously
use mood-related explanations for other’s behaviour (Meerum Terwogt, 2002).
In contrast, children with HFASD tend to explain mood states by referring
to concrete, non-social aspects rather than social or emotional aspects of a
situation (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Jaedicke et al., 1994; Rieffe et al., in press;
Serra et al., 1995). Their reluctance to use mood-related explanations may
be due to a failure to acknowledge the causal influence of moods on behav-
iour. Thus, children with HFASD may understand that certain moods are
connected to certain behaviour, but likely fail to apply this understanding by
providing relevant causal explanations of this connection.
Third, previous studies suggested that the performance of children with
HFASD on explicit tasks of social or emotional understanding, where all
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elements of a problem are given, can be highly adequate, while they gener-
ally fail in more implicit, naturalistic settings (Happé, 1994; Klin, 2000).
Therefore, adequate responses and explanations of the influence of mood on
behaviour may be triggered more when children with HFASD are presented
with explicit and straightforward information. With implicit and distracting
information, these children likely fail to detect and interpret relevant cues,
and their otherwise adequate emotional understanding will not be retrieved.
Fourth, mood states are directive, but not imperative for behavioural
tendencies. This uncertain relationship between mood and behaviour is hard
to capture in strict rules. The multitude of possible social consequences of
someone’s mood state requires an understanding of the changeable influ-
ence of moods on behaviour, e.g. understanding that when your dad is
angry he usually but not necessarily wants to be left alone. Typically develop-
ing 6-year-olds acknowledge that it is uncertain whether specific situa-
tional contexts will result in specific mood states (Gnepp and Klayman,
1992), and can be assumed to show a similar ability to deal with uncertain
consequences of mood states. The inclination of children with HFASD to
rely on strict, certain rules in their understanding of emotions (Klin et al.,
2003; Peterson et al., 2005) may result in a neglect of references to the
uncertain effect of mood on behaviour.
In summary, it is hypothesized that children with HFASD are (1) able
to connect explicit information on mood and behaviour by using general
rules, such as the congruence of valence. However, their pragmatic impair-
ments and their tendency to rely on strict rules should result in (2) a
diminished ability to explain the connection between mood and behav-
iour, (3) a strong dependence on explicit and straightforward information
on emotions, and (4) a limited understanding of the uncertain nature of
the connection between mood and behaviour. These hypotheses were tested
by asking children to predict and explain the behaviour of story characters
in hypothetical social situations. In Study 1, the mood states of the story
characters were explicitly described; in Study 2, they were described implic-
itly and irrelevant information was added to the stories.
Study 1: inferring behaviour based on explicitly described
mood states
In this study we addressed whether children with HFASD are equally able
as typically developing children to connect explicitly described positive or
negative mood states of story characters to positive (helping) or negative
(teasing) behavioural tendencies, respectively, to explain this connection
and to refer to the uncertainty with which mood states result in behavioural
outcomes.
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We expected that children with HFASD would, in comparison to their
typically developing peers, (1) be equally able to make congruent connec-
tions between mood states and behavioural tendencies, i.e. positive mood
with positive behaviour and negative mood with negative behaviour, but
(2) provide less mood-related explanations for the behaviour, i.e. refer-
ences to mood or situation factors as causing the behaviour, and (3) refer
less often to the uncertain influence of mood on behaviour.
Method
Participants
Two groups of 32 children each were included in Study 1. Thirty-two
children with HFASD, 31 boys and one girl (mean age 9.7, SD 1.7), were
recruited from child psychiatric centres and schools in The Netherlands
which specialized in autism spectrum disorders. The diagnostic classifi-
cation of the children was based on assessments by a child psychiatrist, and
on reports of multiple informants who observed the children in the resi-
dential living group and in school. The children fulfilled established diag-
nostic criteria for ASD (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The mean
IQ scores of the HFASD group were: total, 101.3, SD 15.7; verbal, 104.3,
SD 18.0; non-verbal, 99.4, SD 17.3. The IQ scores of this group were based
on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children–III (Wechsler et al., 1986)
or the RAKIT intelligence test (Bleichrodt, 1988).
The comparison group consisted of 32 typically developing children
(31 boys and one girl, mean age 9.8, SD 1.4) recruited from primary schools
in the Amsterdam region. Children in the comparison and HFASD group
were matched as closely as possible on age, gender and IQ. Comparison
children were not explicitly tested for their intelligence, but teachers were
asked to choose children with average verbal skills in order to correspond
with the HFASD group. Other inclusion criteria specified that the children’s
native language was Dutch, and that they had no learning disabilities or
other disorders. At the time of testing, the elementary school system in The
Netherlands was based on an outplacement policy of cognitively delayed
children (i.e. IQ scores <70) to special education institutes (Driessen, 2002).
Material
The material consisted of four stories. In each story, two different charac-
ters were introduced: one in a positive (happy) mood, and one in a negative
(angry) mood. The story characters’ mood states and the events that caused
these mood states were explicitly described, e.g. ‘Joost is happy, he made a
nice drawing; Kees is angry, his Game Boy broke.’ Out of these four stories,
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two stories then continued to describe positive behaviour, e.g. helping to
fix someone’s bicycle, and two other stories continued with negative
behaviour, e.g. deliberately flattening someone’s bicycle tyre. Children were
then asked (1) to estimate which one of the two story characters performed
the described behaviour, and (2) to explain the reasons for this character’s
behaviour. See Table 1 for a fully transcribed story version.
Procedure
After the consent of both parent and child had been established, children
were tested individually by one experimenter (SB) in a quiet room at their
school or institute in one session of approximately 25 minutes. Four stories
sequences, alternating between positive and negative stories, were random-
ized across the subjects. These sequences were equally distributed over the
HFASD and comparison groups. Sessions were audio-recorded and tran-
scribed later.
Scoring
Mood–behaviour congruence Responses to the question regarding the
behaviour of the story character were scored as ‘mood-congruent’ when
the story character with a positive mood was assigned positive behaviour
or the character with a negative mood was assigned negative behaviour.
Mood-congruent responses were awarded one point; non-mood-congruent
responses were awarded no points. All children received two scores ranging
from 0 to 2, reflecting their summed scores of congruent mood–behaviour
responses per condition (positive or negative).
Mood-related explanations Explanations were coded in two categories:
inclusion of a reference to mood (e.g. ‘Kees did it because he was angry’)
or inclusion of a reference to the event that caused the mood (e.g. ‘Kees
did it because his Game Boy broke’). Explanations that included at least
B E G E E R E T A L . : I N F L U E N C E O F M O O D O N B E H AV I O U R
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Ricardo’s Game Boy broke and can’t be fixed anymore. Ricardo is angry and moody.
Iwan made a nice clay statue. He is going to give it to his mother. Iwan is happy and
cheerful.
This is Steven. At school, Steven saw that someone flattened his bicycle tyre. Now he
has to walk all the way home. Neither Ricardo nor Iwan are friends of Steven. Both
Ricardo and Iwan often tease other children. What do you think, which of these two
boys flattened Steven’s tyre? Why do you think so?
Table 1 Example of a story in the negative behaviour condition used in Study 1
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one reference to mood or event were awarded one point in one or both of
these categories. Categories were not exclusive. All children received two
scores per condition (positive or negative story), ranging from 0 to 2. One
score reflected the number of references to mood, the other score the
number of references to events as possible causal factors of behaviours.
Uncertain relation between mood and behaviour In order to quantify
the child’s acknowledgement of the uncertainty of the relation between
mood and behaviour, we counted the number of responses in which
children included terms that referred to uncertainty, e.g. ‘Maybe Kees did it
because he was angry’, ‘Kees was angry so he probably did it’, or explicit
indications of the uncertainty of the effect of mood on behaviour, e.g. ‘He
could/might have done it.’ Explanations that included at least one of the above
elements were awarded one point. The analyses were conducted for all four
stories together and children received one score that ranged from 0 to 4.
Syntactic quality The syntactic quality of children’s responses was
explored through analyses of discourse structure, including length, and the
extent of experimenter prompting necessary for the eliciting of responses.
We assessed length by tallying the number of words and the number of
clauses, defined as a verb and its arguments, in each response. The frequency
of experimenter prompting to elicit a response provided a measure of the
ease with which children provided their explanations.
Two raters, graduate students who were blind to the diagnosis of the
children, independently coded a selection of the transcripts. Interrater
reliability between the coders was monitored using Cohen’s kappa for 10
randomly selected transcripts. Kappas were 0.78 for references to mood
states, 0.80 for references to events, and 1.00 for references to uncertainty.
Results
We first established that total IQ, verbal IQ and non-verbal IQ were not
significantly correlated with any of the scores within the HFASD group (all
p > 0.15).
Mood–behaviour congruence
Within the negative and the positive condition, the chance level score for
corresponding mood–behaviour responses was 1, based on two stories with
a chance level of 0.5. Inspection of Table 2 indicates that the mean number
of congruent mood–behaviour responses of all children was far above
chance level (p < 0.001), in particular in the positive behaviour condition.
Children from HFASD and comparison groups responded similarly to the
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positive and negative story versions, and therefore the scores were collapsed
over both story conditions. As expected, children with and without HFASD
equally often connected mood states of story characters with congruent
behaviour (F(1, 62) = 0.21, p = 0.88).
Mood-related explanations
In the analysis of the explanations, stories were collapsed over the two story
version conditions, because they did not interfere with the results. A 2
(group: HFASD and comparison)  2 (reference: mood and event) mixed-
design ANOVA showed no main effect for group (F < 1), but there was a
main effect for reference (F(1, 62) = 144.93, p < 0.01) and an interaction
effect for group  reference (F(1, 62) = 9.17, p < 0.01). As shown in Table
2, children from both groups referred more often to moods than events in
their responses. However, children with HFASD showed a trend towards a
higher number of mood references than comparison children (simple
effect, F(1, 62) = 3.59, p < 0.06), whereas comparison children referred
more often to events as causal factors of behaviour than children with
HFASD (simple effect, F(1, 62) = 8.14, p < 0.01).
Uncertain relation between mood and behaviour
In their responses to the stories, children with HFASD (mean = 0.38, SD
= 0.75, range 0–4) referred significantly less often to uncertainty terms in
their explanations of the causal relation between mood and behaviour than
children from the comparison group (mean = 0.88, SD = 1.01) (F(1, 62) =
5.06, p < 0.03).
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Table 2 Mean (SD) number of responses that included mood-congruent
behaviour in the positive and the negative behaviour conditions (range 0–2) and
references to mood or event as causal factors of behaviour (range 0–4) for
children with HFASD and comparison children
Groupa Mood–behaviour congruence References to mood or event as
causal factors of behaviour
Negative Positive Causal mood* Causal event**
behaviour behaviour
version version
HFASD 1.47 (0.84) 1.91 (0.30) 3.44 (1.01) 0.25 (0.67)
Comparison 1.56 (0.72) 1.84 (0.45) 2.88 (1.34) 0.97 (1.26)
a n = 32 for each group.
* p < 0.06, ** p < 0.01.
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Syntactic quality
The syntactic quality of the responses did not differ between children with
HFASD or comparisons in terms of number of words used (mean = 10.51,
SD = 5.08 versus mean = 13.52, SD = 9.92, respectively) or number of
clauses (mean = 1.71, SD = 0.80 versus mean = 2.21, SD = 1.87, respec-
tively) or number of experimenter prompts that were needed to elicit a
response (twice in the HFASD and once in the comparison group).
Discussion of Study 1
The majority of children from the HFASD and the comparison group
adequately connected explicit descriptions of story characters’ moods with
congruent behaviour. However, children with HFASD, unexpectedly, showed
a tendency to explain this connection by referring to mood states even more
than children from the comparison group. The latter, in turn, more often
referred to the event that caused the mood state. Thus, like comparison
children, children with HFASD clearly seemed to explicitly acknowledge
mood as a possible moderator of behaviour. A limitation of the current
study is that there appears to have been a ceiling effect in the measure of
mood–behaviour congruence in the positive stories.
The lower frequency of mood references in the typically developing
group seems counterintuitive and did not coincide with their more
frequent reference to events as causal factors. An explanation for this
finding may be that the influence of the explicitly mentioned mood state
was considered so obvious for them that the typically developing children
did not think it necessary to repeat the mood references to the experi-
menter as an elicitor of the story character’s behaviour. A similar effect was
found in an earlier study with HFASD children (Rieffe et al., 2000). This
assumption does imply that the effect would disappear when the mood
component is described less explicitly. This implication will be addressed
in Study 2.
Study 2: inferring behaviour based on implicitly described
mood states
Based on the findings of the first study, it could be argued that explicit
mood state information enabled children with HFASD to reason about the
social consequences of mood in a manner similar to comparison children.
Moreover, children with HFASD seemed to acknowledge the importance of
mood information, since they actively presented mood states as reasons for
the story character’s behaviour. However, in daily life, someone’s mood
state often needs to be derived from implicit sources of information, which
A U T I S M 11(6)
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is troublesome for children with HFASD (Klin et al., 2003). Given their
dependence on explicit information to be able to understand emotional
situations (Loveland et al.,1997), it might well be that children with HFASD
fail at tasks on emotion understanding if needed cues are less obvious.
Therefore, in a second study, we assessed whether children with HFASD are
able to correspond implicit mood descriptions with behavioural responses
equally as well as comparison children. To further manipulate the clarity
of the mood descriptions, we used two types of stories: short implicit stories
that resembled the stories from Study 1 but did not explicitly mention mood
states; and long implicit stories that included added irrelevant context infor-
mation. Compared to typically developing children, we expected children
with HFASD to make less congruent connections between moods and
behaviour and refer less often to moods or events as possible causal factors
of behaviour. These group differences were expected to increase in the
longer story versions compared to the short versions. A lower number of
references to the uncertain influence of mood on behaviour was expected
in the HFASD children following all story versions.
Method
Participants
Two groups of children (n = 29 each) were recruited for the second study.
The first group included children with HFASD (one girl, 28 boys, mean age
11.1, SD 2.2). These were all different children than those participating in
Study 1, but they were recruited from the same institutions, and diagnosed
according to the same classification procedures. The comparison group
included typically developing children (one girl, 28 boys, mean age 11.0,
SD 1.1), recruited from primary schools in the Amsterdam region, which
were different children than the comparison children participating in Study
1. The mean IQ scores of the HFASD group were: total, 94.1, SD 18.0; verbal,
94.54, SD 17.0; non-verbal, 91.5, SD 16.7. The children in the comparison
group were not explicitly tested for their intelligence, but according to their
teachers they showed intelligence within the ‘normal’ range.
Material
Children were presented with eight stories in which mood-eliciting events
were described that occurred to two story characters. In every story, one
character experienced a positive event (e.g. ‘Tom won with gymnastics’);
the other character experienced a negative event (e.g. ‘Bob lost his judo
match’). Both events were expected to affect the story character’s mood
states accordingly, but in contrast with Study 1, mood states were not
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explicitly mentioned. The stories then continued with the description of
positive behaviour (four stories) or negative behaviour (four stories),
comparable to the behaviour descriptions used in Study 1 (e.g. fixing or
destroying other children’s property). Children were asked which one of
the characters committed the described (positive or negative) behaviour,
and were asked to explain why. The stories were presented in four short
(see Table 3) and four long (see Table 4) versions, equally distributed across
the positive and negative behaviour stories. The longer versions contained
irrelevant, distracting context information about the two story characters,
such as where they lived and what their hobbies were. Full story versions
can be obtained from the first author.
Procedure
The procedure was similar to Study 1, with the following changes: four
different sequences of the eight stories, alternating between positive and
A U T I S M 11(6)
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Bob lost his judo match today. He trained really hard for it.
Tom did really well in the gymnastics class today. He was the best man of the team.
Your bicycle is broken. However, when you come home after school, you find that
someone has fixed your bike. Bob and Tom are both friends of yours. Bob and Tom
are both very able to fix a bike, and one of them has fixed the bike.
What do you think, which one of these boys has fixed your bike? Why do you think so?
Table 3 Example of a short story in the positive behaviour condition used in
Study 2
Steven and Jan are both living in your street. Jan got new colour markers last week. He
took them with him to school. When he wanted to draw a painting today, he found that
someone did not put the lids back on the markers. Now they are all dried out.
Steven always wanted to have a dog. His parents used to say that he wasn’t allowed to
have a dog, but Steven’s aunt’s dog had puppies. Steven’s aunt cannot keep all the pups, so
this week, Steven is allowed to pick a dog.
Jan and Steven both have the same bike. Yesterday you asked both of them if you
could borrow their bike. When you come home, you see that a bike is standing in your
garden. You do not know whose bike it is. Jan and Steven are both friends of yours.
What do you think; did Jan or Steven lend you his bike? Why do you think so?
Table 4 Example of a long story in the positive behaviour condition used in
Study 2; distracting context information is italicized
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negative, as well as between short and long stories, were randomized over
the subjects.
Scoring
Mood–behaviour congruence Mood-congruent responses were scored
similarly to Study 1, congruent responses were given a score of 1, non-
congruent responses were scored 0. Within the long and short story version
conditions a total score ranging from 0 to 4 was computed to reflect the
summed congruent responses.
Mood-related explanations All explanations that included references to
mood or the event that caused the mood were awarded one point. For each
condition (long or short) total scores were computed, ranging from 0 to
4, the first one to reflect the summed number of references to mood, the
second to reflect the summed number of references to the event that caused
the mood.
Uncertain relation between mood and behaviour All explanations that
included at least one of the uncertainty terms (see scoring Study 1) were
awarded one point. Analyses were performed over all eight stories together
(score range 0–8).
Syntactic quality The syntactic quality of children’s responses was scored
similar to Study 1, differentiating between number of words, clauses and
experimenter prompts.
Two graduate students, blind to the age and diagnosis of the children,
independently coded a selection of the transcripts. Interrater reliability was
monitored using Cohen’s  for 10 randomly selected transcripts, and found
to be satisfactory ( = 0.70 for mood references, 0.76 for references to
events that caused the mood and 1.00 for uncertainty understanding).
Kappas proved to be highly similar to those found in Study 1.
Control measures
In order to control for possible differences between children with HFASD
and normally developing children in the general ability to infer infor-
mation from implicit sources, we designed two additional stories with
implicit non-mood information that could be used to predict behavioural
outcomes (e.g. ‘Lisa lives on a farm, Wendy lives in a flat, who has fed the
rabbits in the schoolyard?’). These stories were comparable to the long
story versions, and included positive or negative behaviour. Responses were
scored for the congruence of implicit source and behaviour and the refer-
ences to the implicit source in chidren’s explanations.
B E G E E R E T A L . : I N F L U E N C E O F M O O D O N B E H AV I O U R
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Results
Again, total IQ, verbal IQ and non-verbal IQ were not significantly corre-
lated with any of the scores within the HFASD group (all ps > 0.15).
Mood–behaviour congruence
The HFASD group connected positive and negative mood to behaviour
remarkably well. Table 5 indicates that children in both HFASD and compari-
son groups scored well above chance (p < 0.001) in identifying characters
whose behaviour and moods were of equal valence. The scores were
collapsed over the positive and negative behaviour conditions, because no
effect of story valence was found. Contrary to our expectation, children
with HFASD performed at a similar level to the comparison group in both
the short and long story versions. A 2 (group: HFASD and comparison) 
2 (story length: short and long) mixed-design ANOVA showed no main or
interaction effects.
Mood-related explanations
Explanations were analysed for references to mood or event in the two story
length conditions. A 2 (group: HFASD and comparison)  2 (story length:
short and long)  2 (reference: mood and event) mixed-design ANOVA
indicated an interaction effect of group  story length (F(1, 56) = 4.83, p <
0.05) but no interaction effect of group  reference (F(1, 56) = 1.45, p =
0.23) or other effects. The group  story length interaction principally
emanated from the higher rate of reported mood and event references in
the long story condition of comparison children compared to children with
A U T I S M 11(6)
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Table 5 Mean (SD) number of responses that included mood–behaviour
congruence and number of responses that included references to mood or
event as causal factors of behaviour of children with HFASD and comparison
children following short and long story versions (range 0–4)
Groupa Short story version Long story versionb*
HFASD Mood–behaviour congruence 2.86 (1.16) 3.09 (0.91)
Causal mood 1.48 (1.53) 1.21 (1.32)
Causal event 1.72 (1.22) 1.55 (1.15)
Comparison Mood–behaviour congruence 3.21 (1.08) 3.14 (0.95)
Causal mood 1.93 (2.70) 1.97 (1.42)
Causal event 1.55 (1.21) 1.86 (0.95)
a n = 29 for each group.
b Children with HFASD reported fewer mood and event references than comparison children in the
long story versions only.
* p < 0.05.
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HFASD (simple effect, F(1, 56) = 5.87, p < 0.05). Children with HFASD
explained their responses to the longer story versions relatively more often
by referring to non-emotional features of the story characters (size, appear-
ance and abilities; e.g. ‘he is bigger’) or the situation (time and space; e.g.
‘she was in her room’), even though these features were kept identical for
both story characters. In only five out of 232 responses children said they
didn’t know why the character they chose would be the likely actor of the
described behaviour. This happened four times in the HFASD and once in
the comparison group.
The short story condition elicited similar levels of mood and event refer-
ences in the HFASD and comparison groups (simple effect, F(1, 56) = 2.13,
n.s.) (Table 5).
Uncertain relation between mood and behaviour
Again, children with HFASD made fewer references to uncertainty terms
in the explanations of the causal relation between mood and behaviour
(mean = 0.45, SD = 0.91, range 0–8) than children from the comparison
group (mean = 1.66, SD = 2.47) (F(1, 56) = 6.11, p < 0.02).
Syntactic quality
Children with HFASD used fewer words than children from the compari-
son group (mean = 9.38, SD = 3.00 versus mean = 14.86, SD = 11.19,
respectively) (F(1, 56) = 6.50, p < 0.02), and also included fewer clauses
(mean = 1.53, SD = 0.43 versus mean = 2.30, SD = 1.68, respectively).
However, including the number of words or clauses as covariates did not
alter the results of the analyses of the mood-related explanations. Further-
more, no difference was found in the number of experimenter prompts
that were needed to elicit a response (twice in the HFASD group and four
times in the comparison group).
Control measures
The implicit source–behaviour congruence responses given in response to
the non-mood stories were compared to the mood–behaviour congruence
responses given in the mood stories. A 2 (group: HFASD and comparison)
 2 (information: mood and non-mood) mixed-design ANOVA showed a
main effect for information (F(1, 56) = 16.78, p < 0.01), but no other
effects. All children made more corresponding behavioural inferences
following non-mood (mean = 0.93, SD = 0.13, score range 0–1) than
mood (mean = 0.78, SD = 0.23) stories. While the non-mood stories seem
to have elicited ceiling effects in both groups, they do indicate that the
ability to make behavioural inferences based on implicit information is
clearly available to children from both comparison and HFASD groups.
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Interestingly, children with HFASD referred to the implicit cause of the
non-emotion stories in all their responses, while comparison children
partially failed to do so (chi2 = 88.17, p < 0.01). References to the un-
certain relation between the implicit source and the behaviour in the non-
emotion stories did not differ between comparisons and children with
HFASD.
Discussion of Study 2
The second study indicated that the majority of HFASD and typically
developing children adequately connected mood states with congruent
behaviour, even if these mood states were not explicitly described or had
to be inferred from irrelevant context information. Children’s explanations
of story characters’ behaviours were not equivalent between the groups.
The short story versions indicated equal numbers of mood and event refer-
ences in both groups. Following the long story versions, where distracting
context information was added to the story content, children with HFASD
referred less often to mood and event as causal factors than typically
developing children. Furthermore, children with HFASD referred less often
to the uncertainty of the connection between mood and behaviour than
typically developing children. Again, all findings were independent of the
IQ in the HFASD group.
General discussion
High-functioning children with ASD and their typically developing peers
connected at equal rates the descriptions of story characters’ positive or
negative moods with descriptions of positive or negative behaviour, respec-
tively. It made no difference whether mood descriptions were presented
explicitly, implicitly or combined with distracting context information: all
children seemed to make equal use of the basic rule that positive or
negative mood states affect behavioural tendencies accordingly. The finding
that the application of this rule was not influenced by the absence of
explicit mood descriptions or the addition of irrelevant information was
unexpected. Apparently, children with HFASD are able to extrapolate
relevant mood information from these implicit sources, and do not rely as
strongly on explicit sources as anticipated. Alternatively, they may have relied
on a more general rule regarding the congruence of same-valenced story
elements which, besides mood and behaviour, can also consist of context
information.
As expected, the main group differences were identified in the expla-
nations of the mood–behaviour congruence. Children from the HFASD and
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comparison groups differed on two accounts: the number of mood-related
explanations, i.e. references to mood or events, and the number of refer-
ences to the uncertain relation between mood and behaviour.
The direction of the group differences in the mood-related explanations
depended on the explicitness and complexity of the mood descriptions.
Following the explicit mood descriptions of the first study, the group effect
was counter-intuitive: children with HFASD relatively more often mentioned
moods of story characters, while children from the comparison group –
besides their references to moods – more often mentioned events that
caused the story character’s mood states. As discussed above, the possibility
exists that children from the comparison group found the – explicitly
described – mood states of the story characters so obvious that they would
consider it unnecessary to mention these again in their explanations,
instead referring more often to the event causing the mood state. Indeed,
the group difference disappeared when mood information was no longer
explicit in the second study.
Following the long story versions, which also included irrelevant infor-
mation, the group effect partly reversed: children with HFASD now gave
fewer mood-related explanations than comparison children. This may indi-
cate that they extended the ‘valence congruency’ rule to implicit infor-
mation on mood, which allowed them to connect a negative situation (e.g.
losing a judo match) to negative behaviour (e.g. destroying property)
without having to consider the mood state (anger) as the underlying cause
of the behaviour. This result supports previously suggested ideas that
children with HFASD are inclined to reason about emotions by relying on
‘rote solutions’, such as the currently suggested ‘valence congruence’ rule,
but are limited in their ability to generalize such rules to other domains,
as currently evidenced by their lack of references to mood states as causing
behaviour (Kaland et al., 2002; Klin et al., 2003; Peterson et al., 2005; Pons
& Harris, 2005).
Some mood–behaviour incongruence responses could have reflected
emotional understanding, for example when children report ‘mood
improvement’ strategies (Stegge et al.,1994). In such responses, a negative
mood is connected with positive behaviour, followed by mood improve-
ment explanations (e.g. ‘X will help because he is sad and helping will
cheer him up’). We avoided sadness as an initial mood state in our scripts,
since in contrast to anger, sadness is known to stimulate positive behaviour
for various reasons (Meerum Terwogt, 2002). However, even in an angry
person, mood improvement can be a reason to do something positive: ‘He
helps, because it takes his mind off [the angering incident]’ or ‘He helps,
because it makes him feel better.’ Although not a part of the original coding
scheme, this feature was noted because it was exclusively found within the
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comparison group (five times in total over both studies). These responses
had no impact on the congruence scores, and due to their low frequency,
the interpretation of these responses is preliminary. Still, they indicate
advanced ways of reasoning about emotions in social interactions that are
relevant to future studies with both children and adults with HFASD.
Both studies confirmed that children with HFASD referred to the un-
certain connection between mood and behaviour less than comparison
children, who more often explicitly acknowledged that someone’s mood
is a heuristic for someone’s behaviour, i.e. when you are angry you usually
but not necessarily act it out. Children with HFASD generally neglected this
uncertain element and seemed to interpret the influence of mood on behav-
iour in a more deterministic fashion, i.e. when angry, you act it out. Possibly,
children with HFASD do not possess sufficient linguistic abilities to report
on uncertainty with respect to mood and behaviour (Losh and Capps, 2003).
However, their equally coherent explanations are not in congruence with
this hypothesis, and no group differences were found in the number of
references to uncertainty in the non-mood control stories. The explanation
that the low number of references to uncertainty terms may indicate a deter-
ministic appreciation of the influence of mood on behaviour would be more
in line with the tendency of children with HFASD to seek rote solutions in
their reasoning about emotions (Capps et al., 1992; Peterson et al., 2005).
The present study is limited in the information about participants’
characteristics. This information was not collected because the Dutch
elementary school system is based on an outplacement policy for cogni-
tively delayed children. Furthermore, findings of both studies were inde-
pendent of IQ in the HFASD group. However, including more explicit IQ
measures of comparison children would have allowed us to provide more
convincing evidence for the suggested equal verbal skills in both groups,
and contrast these to the observed group differences in explaining emotions.
Also, standardized diagnostic measures would have decreased the likeli-
hood of misdiagnoses, and the inclusion of measures on adaptive behav-
iour would have allowed the direct comparison of theoretical abilities to
natural behaviour.
Still, the adequate responses and explanations of the non-emotional
control stories of the second study indicated that HFASD children were able
to reason about implicit causes of behaviour. Furthermore, the length of
responses in Study 1 was identical for HFASD and comparison children. In
Study 2, responses of children with HFASD were shorter than those of
comparison children, but controlling for length did not alter the main effects.
Lastly, the fact that even the most complex stories elicited only five ‘don’t
know’ responses in total, and both studies required hardly any prompting
to elicit responses, suggest adequate story comprehension in all children.
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To summarize, we posit that the influence of mood on behaviour is
acknowledged by children with HFASD, but that their explanations for this
influence suggest a rote- rather than self-generated understanding of the
causal role of mood on behaviour. When the necessary elements for an
adequate explanation were explicitly described, children with HFASD could
connect information about mood states and behaviour based on their
valence. Using this general rule, it would make sense to include, for example,
references to positive mood states when arguing for positive behavioural
tendencies. However, following implicit and obscured descriptions, the
possibility to revert back to explicit information in the stories was closed
off and children had to generate responses on their own account. In these
cases they emphasized mood-related information less often than typically
developing children, which suggests that they know the general rules, but
seem less attentive to mood-related information in their explanations. These
results map neatly to the difficulties of ASD children in understanding the
hedonic value of their sensory environment, as suggested by the social-
affective dysfunction theory of autism (Hobson, 1989; 1993).
To further our knowledge of the pragmatics in the emotional under-
standing of children with HFASD, it is necessary to closely delineate the
extent and the development of the emotional understanding of children
with HFASD, encompassing issues on how and when these children apply
their understanding of emotions in natural settings. When further studies
confirm the currently suggested rote-based understanding of emotions in
children with HFASD, this information should be integrated in clinical
practice. Standard diagnostic instruments such as the ADOS–G (Lord et al.,
2000), or measures used in research on intervention effects (Howlin, 2005;
Lord et al., 2005), could be improved by specifying questions to tap into
children’s rote- or self-generated aspects of emotional understanding. This
may prevent clinicians and researchers from being misled by the adequate
responses of children with HFASD, which may not indicate the same type
of emotional understanding, i.e. based on the integration of personal social
and affective experiences, that can be found in typically developing children.
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